New insights were shared with the Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on Wednesday by Palestinian insiders about the Hamas-led offensive on October 7.
The assault’s decision-making and timing were confined to a group of five: Yahya Sinwar, the Gaza Strip’s Hamas leader; Mohammed Deif, commander of Hamas’s military wing brigades; Yahya Sinwar’s sibling, Mohammed Sinwar; Ruhi Mushtaha; and Ayman Nofal, who held a central role in the Palestinian factions’ joint operations room and was killed during the conflict.
The sources revealed that the quintet chose October 7 for the operation upon receiving reports of unusual quiet at the border from their field units.
On the preceding Friday, these five leaders determined that the best time for the attack would be Saturday morning, a day off in Israel. They waited until midnight before signaling readiness.
Field commanders and Nukhba force leaders were then briefed and began their advance in the early morning, culminating in the launch of the attack.
It was also noted by the sources that senior Hamas figures outside the region, such as political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, were aware of an impending major assault but were not privy to the specific date. They were informed a few hours prior to the operation.
The incursion involved 70 militants executing a surprise offensive along various points of the Gaza Strip border, from north to south. They breached the border fence, exploiting its vulnerabilities, and utilized gliders and parachutes to land near IDF positions.
These 70 militants, handpicked from Gaza’s Nukhba fighters, were chosen for their exceptional training and regularly tested skills.
To prevent intelligence leaks to Israeli forces, many of Gaza’s brigade commanders were kept in the dark about the attack plans.
A year before this unexpected Hamas strike, Maj. Gen. Eliezer Toledano, the Southern Command chief, conducted a secret meeting where he cautioned about the need for a preemptive strike. This was recently disclosed on KAN’s Evening News program.
This meeting was held against the backdrop of Hamas’s extensive assault strategy, dubbed “The Wall of Jericho,” intended for simultaneous infiltration into Israel, alongside Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s military escalation.
Recently, the New York Times released an investigative piece on the October 7 attack, highlighting the IDF’s unpreparedness. The report detailed the IDF’s ad-hoc approach, where soldiers relied on WhatsApp and social media for target selection, and helicopter pilots used media and Telegram channel reports to identify targets.
The report further described Maglan Commando unit soldiers arriving at combat zones without specific assignments, and instances where soldiers collated intelligence independently or with the help of a Netivot local who monitored Hamas videos online.
Helicopter pilots were advised by a team commander to pick targets based on news and Telegram channel information.
